What follows is a speech I gave in December 2005 before the NY Society of Security Analysts. It was billed as a celebration of Graham-and-Dodd style value investing, and indeed the invitation had been a consequence of an article I wrote earlier that year, in which I explored a dramatically successful group of patient investors. I used the occasion to look at some quite different funds, ones which play the performance game, turning over their portfolios at stunning rates and at disheartening cost. An update of my earlier data provided a useful benchmark.
Irving, happy birthday. We're here to celebrate your centennial, your contributions to value investing, and beyond that, the very concept of value investing that you epitomized. In a society where it shows a lack of testosterone not to have bought or sold stocks every day, you've been a model of wisdom and sanity. Congratulations, best wishes, and we know now that sane investing contributes to a long life.
It was suggested that I discuss my recent article, "Searching for Rational Investors in a
Perfect Storm" b and the earlier piece by Warren Buffett, "The Superinvestors of Graham-andDoddsville," with which it has happily been linked.
First off, I want to do a brief sketch of the mutual fund universe, the culture if you wish, in which value investors now work. It's rather different from the one in which Buffett wrote "The Superinvestors," twenty-one years ago. Today, equity mutual funds account for about $4 trillion, up from a far more modest $250 billion as recently as 1990. Quite apart from hedge funds and ETFs, those equity funds now own 28% of all common stocks, as against only 8% in 1990. 1 And they're owned, I am told, by 95 million families. 2 It's a reflection, I suspect, of a pervasive anxiety about corporate pension plans and Social Security, a sense that it could get cold out there in the so-called golden years. Now let's take that $4 trillion in equity funds and break it down into three broad sectors:
first, the great preponderance of actively managed funds; second, the various index funds, which come now in a variety of flavors and are said to account for one-seventh of the total, or almost $600 billion; and then finally, the third and smallest sector, the assets managed by the true-blue, walk-the-walk value investors of whom Buffett and I wrote. My wise friend, the now late Bill Ruane, said years ago that value investors accounted for, perhaps, 5% of all professionally managed monies. Perhaps the proportion is lower now, but regardless, it's clear that 80% of all equity funds are managed energetically so as to keep pace with the market, wherever that happens to be.
Investing at warp speed. The average mutual fund turns over its portfolio at 100% or more a year. Let's call it "investing at warp speed." Being alien to that world, in March of this year I called Don Phillips of Morningstar, who helped me set up a baseline group of large cap growth funds, the twenty largest in assets at year-end 1997. That would, we thought, provide a representative sample. Largely due to mergers and style drift, there are now fifteen survivors ("Group of Fifteen"). 3 Given the usual survivor bias, they should have performed rather well.
For this gathering of dyed-in-the-wool value investors, however, the results may seem rather ghastly. On the other hand, you may enjoy eyeballing the victims, and tut-tutting that the passengers weren't wearing seat belts.
For the five years ended this past August 31, the Group of Fifteen experienced on average negative returns of 8.89% per year, vs. a negative 2.71% for the S&P 500. 4 The group of ten value funds I had studied in the "Searching for Rational Investors" article had been suggested by Trust, truly a mutual fund, in the sense that it was managed internally, supplemented by an advisory board of six prominent Boston businessmen. 7 In 1969, when management was shifted to an external company, now known as MFS Investment Management, the total expense ratio was a modest 0.32%. For the five years ended in 2003, turnover in the fund averaged 250%. All that senseless trading took a toll. For the five years ended this past August, average annual returns were a negative 9-1/2%. Over the past ten years, which included the glory days of the New Economy, the fund did better, almost matching the index, though still trailing our value funds by 4% a year.
Net assets which had been a modest $1.9 billion at Don Phillips' kickoff date in 1997, and had risen to $17 billion in 2000, are now about $8 billion.
If you're feeling some sympathy for the passengers in this financial vehicle, hold on. In fact, there's a story beneath all that churning by shareholders. Early last year, MFS settled charges brought by the SEC and state authorities charging that eleven of its funds had engaged either in "directed brokerage," meaning that instead of obtaining the best execution for their portfolio transactions, the funds had rewarded brokers who helped market the fund, and/or in market timing abuses, which the funds had assured investors they would not allow. In both respects, of course, the managers were enriching themselves at shareholder expense. The settlements included a $225 million pool to compensate the affected funds; in addition, the president and chief executive officer of MFS resigned. MFS thus became one of the 23 fund managers who, within a short period, were implicated in the market-timing scandals.
Investors
With new management, one might have expected more candor. In fact, investors in the Growth Stock Fund would have had to be, well, law professors, to unearth from the annual report what had transpired. The only useful disclosure of the charges was way back, in the footnotes to the financials. Intending to do a hands-on look at two other funds, I selected, first, Fidelity Growth Company Fund, because it was currently the largest amongst the group of fifteen, with $25 billion in assets, and second, the American group's Amcap Fund. The Amcap fund had intrigued me because it was the one fund in the group with even modestly positive returns the past five years, but also because both its low portfolio turnover and its substantial cash holdings gave it a seeming resemblance to our value funds. In both cases, I stopped, however, as it became apparent that their respective managements are excessively focused on growing assets as distinct from c . The American funds group has made aggressive use of pay-to-play, i.e., paying brokers to market their funds to investors who would otherwise believe that the "advice" they receive is unbiased. Swensen, Unconventional Success, at 275-9.
d . Morningstar described Fidelity as a "marketing construct," noting that its board of trustees oversees 300 funds (FDGRX stewardship report, 8/10/04). The rational investor, the hypothetical sort who inhabits the academic journals, might buy the Vanguard 500 Index fund and stay put, year after year. But as the behavioral finance scholars have convincingly demonstrated, the passions of the crowd are highly contagious. As Graham and Dodd said 70 years ago, the market is not weighing machine but rather a voting machine, "the product partly of reason and partly of emotion.." 13 To cut to the chase, the appeal of a buy-and-hold index strategy is the ability to minimize fees, expenses and taxes. But the strategy has several shortcomings:
First off, timing still matters, because price and value matter. In real dollars, stocks did not return to their 1966 level until 1992. 14 And as we know, the S&P 500 fell by almost half when the bubble of the '90s broke, and has still not recouped the lost ground. Scholars have written reams about investing, you know the analyses equating value investing with low P/E stocks or some other simple set of numbers that can be crunched with a computer. For example, one current paper examines Buffett's success, focusing on trivia such as how the market responds to news of a new Berkshire investment. 16 This may help someone get tenure or a Ph.D., but in real life it's not relevant.
Surprising as it seems, "The Superinvestors" and my "Searching for Rational Investors" pieces are the only attempts I know of to look directly at a group of value funds one by one, the people running them, and how they applied the basic Graham and Dodd concepts. We looked at value investors bottom up, just as they look at stocks. What I'm getting at is that Buffett and I both felt under some pressure to counter the inevitable criticism that we had simply chosen, with 20/20 hindsight, some very successful managers. He spent a lot of ink explaining that he had been close to this particular group for many years prior and the likelihood of picking such outstanding managers in advance would defy the statistical odds of random chance. I used, of course, the Goldfarb list. While the markets were cheering Oracle and the like into the wild blue yonder, it turned out that these value managers had stayed far, far away from a list of stocks said by Fortune to be good for the decade. Incidentally, every one of the Group of Fifteen had owned at year-end 1999, at the peak of the bubble, one or more of those high-flying stocks, and on average they owned almost three of the ten.
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And even at the time, they had explained their thinking, they had watched as their own investors fled, and still they stayed the course. The Fortune Ten, therefore, was a useful filter, to answer charges of a biased study. e It didn't work, of course, just as Warren's coin-flipping exercise was amusing but futile.
In academia, a hands-on study can never compete with a good computer driven model. 17 So I am announcing tonight that I have turned over a new leaf, and this is it: let efficient market theory go its own way, and henceforth I will go mine. After the World Series, a Chicago reporter said that no matter what, White Sox fans and Cub fans will never be reconciled. Here, too, why try.
Speaking of the academy, we have a guest here tonight from the University of Dublin, Ed
Kelly, for whom the sky lit up when he came across value investing. But he had a problem:
intending to analyze the success of Buffett and other value investors in his Ph.D. thesis, he was met with a blunt faculty response that it was not a statistically rigorous, scholarly endeavor.
Looking for some comfort, he and I have been emailing back and forth. Ed is here with us tonight, having had lunch today with some value investors. Ed, stand up for a second.
Price-and-value, buying a part interest in a business instead of trading stocks, buying at a discount so as to provide a margin of safety. If the concept is so brilliantly simple, why is the execution so remarkably difficult? Start with the concept of margin of safety, the notion of buying into a company only at a substantial discount from what a willing buyer of the whole company would pay. A novice might suspect that the motive is to enhance the likelihood of gain, but the common thread is different, it's a deep, abiding, almost pathological fear of that permanent loss of capital that Ben Graham, having suffered in the Great Crash, would always retain. It runs throughout the literature. 18 Not market loss, but rather loss of intrinsic value, such that the margin of safety becomes just that. As Charlie Munger likes to say, if you're building a bridge intended for 10,000 tons, you build it to carry 30,000.
Bill Nygren of Oakmark Select wrote earlier this year that he had bought Toys R Us at about $10 a share, fully expecting a turnaround at the toy stores. That failed to happen, but having focused, he said, on risk, he saw the underlying real estate as a margin of safety, and five years later sold the stock for nearly $27 a share. g . In the case of the Clipper Fund, the board of directors has taken the unprecedented step of rejecting the manager proposed by the purchaser and making a selection of its own, one with a history much like that of Gipson and his group. Beacon and Clipper will maintain their discipline. g Stewardship vs. salesmanship.
Speaking of discipline, you may remember that after Buffett published "The Superinvestors," someone calculated that while they were indeed superinvestors, on average they had trailed the market one year in three. 20 Tom Russo, of the Semper Vic Partners fund, took a similar look at the Goldfarb Ten and found, for example, that four of them had each underperformed the S&P 500 for four consecutive years, 1996-1999, and in some cases by huge amounts. For the full ten years, of course, that underperformance was sharply reversed, and then some. Value investing thus requires not just patient managers but also patient investors, those with the temperament as well as intelligence to feel comfortable even when sorely out of step with the crowd. If you're fretting that the CBOE Market Volatility Index may be signaling fear this week, value investing is not for you.
Better managers need better investors. In The Superinvestors Buffett concluded that we can preach value, but it's likely to fall on deaf ears. With an army of financial advisers now trying to justify their existence, I suspect that it's gotten even harder.
Irving, again, best wishes and good luck. And Bill, if you can hear me, thanks for the wisdom and the generosity of spirit you brought to people in all walks of life, and a sweet good night to you.
